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COMMERCE, DEATH PANELS, AND BROCCOLI:
OR WHY THE ACTIVITY/INACTIVITY
DISTINCTION IN THE HEALTH CARE CASE WAS
REALLY ABOUT THE RIGHT TO BODILY
INTEGRITY
Michael C. Dorf*
ABSTRACT
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, five
Justices of the United States Supreme Court opined that the
Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress to regulate
“inactivity.” In giving effect to the intuition that laws compelling
activity impose a more serious burden on the individual than do laws
forbidding activity, these Justices mistakenly imported a libertarian
principle into the Court’s federalism jurisprudence. Indeed, the
intuition is not even true in all individual rights cases. Nonetheless, in
the aim of understanding the logic behind the position, this Article
explains how affirmative mandates that infringe the substantive due
process right to bodily integrity can be more intrusive than
prohibitions. In so doing, it draws connections between the political
charge that the health care law would establish “death panels” and
the effective use of the hypothetical fear that upholding the law’s socalled individual mandate would permit the government to require
people to eat broccoli.
INTRODUCTION
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,1 five
Justices of the United States Supreme Court accepted the proposition
* Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School. I am grateful to Byron
Crowe for outstanding research assistance. The author delivered an oral version of this article as the
Spring 2013 Henry J. Miller Distinguished Lecture at Georgia State University College of Law.
1. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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that the Commerce Clause did not provide Congress with the power
to enact the so-called “individual mandate” of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (ACA).2 Why not? Because, they said, the
Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress to regulate
“inactivity.”3 The Court4 thus endorsed a distinction—between
regulable “activity” and non-regulable “inactivity”—that had not
previously played an important, or arguably any, role in its
Commerce Clause doctrine.
Part I of this Article explains why the activity/inactivity distinction
is a mostly harmless but nonetheless unnecessary addition to
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.5 It is mostly harmless because
Congress rarely needs to adopt mandates and, even after the ruling in
the ACA case, can enact de facto mandates via the taxing power. The
distinction is unnecessary because the fears of the five conservative
Justices who endorsed the activity/inactivity distinction were
unfounded. They worried that if Congress could mandate
participation in commerce then its powers under the Commerce
Clause would be limitless. But, as I shall explain, it is fairly simple to
identify laws that Congress would be powerless to pass, even if the
ACA had been upheld under the Commerce Clause. The Court could
2. Id. at 2591 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2648 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ.,
dissenting).
3. See id. at 2586–87 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2649 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ.,
dissenting).
4. I refer to the five votes on the Commerce Clause issue as a decision of “the Court” even though
one can make a respectable argument that it constitutes dicta. After all, Chief Justice Roberts sustained
the mandate under the taxing power, and so one might think that nothing he said about the Commerce
Clause was necessary to the ruling. See id. at 2629 n.12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Yet Chief Justice Roberts himself disagreed. He stated that
his conclusion that the mandate was outside the scope of the Commerce Clause was a necessary step en
route to his decision to invoke the principle of constitutional avoidance in applying the Taxing Clause.
See id. at 2600–01 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). In any event, it makes little long-term difference whether
the Court’s pronouncements on the Commerce Clause in the ACA case were holding or dicta. Lower
courts will follow the principle either way, see, e.g., Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395,
402 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that “repeated dicta from the [Supreme] Court . . . guides our exercise
of . . . legal judgment in this case”); Nichol v. Pullman Standard, Inc., 889 F.2d 115, 120 n.8 (7th Cir.
1989) (noting that “[t]his [c]ourt should respect considered Supreme Court dicta”); cf. Michael C. Dorf,
Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2026 (1994) (explaining why many lower courts follow
well-considered dicta of the Supreme Court), and the ruling itself makes clear that at least as presently
constituted, a majority of the Supreme Court will apply the no-regulation-of-inactivity-under-theCommerce-Clause rule in future cases.
5. See infra Part I.
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have preserved the notion that the powers of Congress are limited
with a rule that allows many but not all mandates, and the shape of
that rule could have been readily adapted from the Court’s own
recent Commerce Clause precedents.
Why, then, did the conservative majority—the four dissenters plus
the Chief Justice—vote to forbid mandates under the Commerce
Clause? The answer to that question can be found in a phrase first
uttered by Justice Kennedy during the oral argument and later
repeated by Chief Justice Roberts in the portion of his opinion that
rejected the Commerce Clause as authority for the ACA mandate.
Justice Kennedy asked Solicitor General Verrilli whether the
government ought “not have a heavy burden of justification” when a
law “chang[es] the relation of the individual to the government.”6
Echoing the sentiment, the Chief Justice wrote in his opinion that
permitting “Congress the same license to regulate what we do not
do” as it enjoys with respect to what we affirmatively do, would
“fundamentally chang[e] the relation between the citizen and the
Federal Government.”7
Note the difference in wording between Justice Kennedy’s
question and Chief Justice Roberts’s statement. Whereas the Chief
Justice was careful to limit his point to the relation between the
citizen and the federal government, Justice Kennedy had referred to a
change in the relation between the individual and “the government”
in a generic sense. I believe that Justice Kennedy’s seemingly less
precise usage more accurately captured the core intuition driving the
votes of all five conservative Justices who sought to limit
government’s ability to regulate inactivity. The intuition is that
government—at any level—may properly tell people what they
cannot do, but not what they must do.
Put less sympathetically, in the ACA case the activity/inactivity
distinction was a libertarian principle masquerading as a principle of

6. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–12, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/
11-398-Tuesday.pdf.
7. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2589.
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federalism. Or, as an amicus brief on behalf of a group of law
professors (including myself) put it:
While offered as a challenge to Congress’s commerce power,
[the ACA challengers’] claim is really about individual liberty,
reflecting an instinct about how far any government, state or
federal, may go in ordering the affairs of its people. Plaintiffs
effectively ask this Court to import a substantive due process
8
limitation into the Commerce Clause.

I continue to think that the five conservative Justices were wrong to
import a substantive due process limitation into the Commerce
Clause, but after explaining why, I shall take up the further question
of whether substantive due process itself ought to be understood as
barring affirmative mandates, either conclusively or presumptively.9
Part II of this Article addresses that question.10 I begin by rejecting
the notion that there is any general prohibition or even presumption
against affirmative government mandates. Nonetheless, the doctrine
that has developed around a particular set of substantive due process
rights—those that may be understood as implementing the right to
bodily integrity—does indeed reflect an intuition that affirmative
mandates are more intrusive than negative prohibitions. I explain
why this intuition might be regarded as sensible. I also explain how
the same intuition connects the political hysteria around the ACA
with the legal case that was marshaled against it. Seeing the matter
through the lens of bodily integrity connects the false but politically
effective charge that the ACA would establish “death panels”11 with
the ACA’s constitutional challengers’ effective use of the fear that
upholding the mandate would permit the government to require
8. Brief of Law Professors Barry Friedman, Matthew Adler et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners and Reversal on the Minimum-Coverage Provision Issue at 4–5, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.,
132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 160237, at *4–5.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See Glenn Kessler, Sarah Palin, ‘Death Panels’ and ‘Obamacare,’ WASH. POST FACT CHECKER
BLOG (June 27, 2012, 4:23 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/sarah-palindeath-panels-and-obamacare/2012/06/27/gJQAysUP7V_blog.html.
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people to eat broccoli. Both death panels and forced consumption of
broccoli raise the specter of a government that directs people’s
intimate decisions about the use of their bodies. That is a legitimate
concern even if it was misplaced in the ACA case and even though it
contradicts decades of attacks on modern substantive due process
doctrine by conservative Justices.
I. COMMERCE
Despite the sturm und drang that accompanied the ACA litigation,
the case may not be especially important as a matter of constitutional
doctrine because neither the Commerce Clause ruling nor the taxing
power ruling imposes a serious limitation on the actual authority of
Congress. To be sure, writing in the New York Times just days after
the ACA ruling, Professor Pamela Karlan characterized the
conservative majority—the four dissenters plus the Chief Justice—as
having “laid down a cache of weapons that future courts can use to
attack many of the legislative achievements of the New Deal and the
Great Society . . . .”12 I agree with Professor Karlan that the portion
of the Court’s ruling invalidating the expansion of Medicaid as going
beyond the scope of the Spending Clause could indeed threaten
important federal legislation. Still, it is worth noting that Justices
Breyer and Kagan joined the conservatives to forge a 7-2 majority on
that point,13 and so it remains possible that the ACA’s Spending
Clause holding will come to mark only an extreme outer limit—the
existence of which the Court’s leading precedents had long
signaled.14
12. Pamela S. Karlan, Opinion, No Respite for Liberals, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/opinion/sunday/no-respite-for-liberals.html?pagewanted
=all&_r=0.
13. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2576. Justices Breyer and Kagan joined in Part IV of the
Chief Justice’s opinion striking down the ACA’s Medicaid expansion as exceeding Congress’s power
under the Spending Clause. Id.; id. at 2666–67 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting)
(“Seven Members of the Court agree that the Medicaid Expansion, as enacted by Congress, is
unconstitutional.”).
14. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (“Our decisions have recognized that in
some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the
point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’” (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,
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Putting aside the Spending Clause, I am not nearly as pessimistic
as Karlan about the likely impact of the Court’s rulings on the taxing
and commerce powers. Karlan frets that given the unpopularity of tax
increases, a Congress that can only regulate through the taxing power
“is a Congress with little power at all.”15 Perhaps, but one should
recall that on this point the Chief Justice joined his four more liberal
colleagues in laying down the rule that Congress may use the taxing
power even when it does not invoke the taxing power.16 And even the
four conservative dissenters were prepared to sustain the individual
mandate if it had been clearly labeled and more clearly structured as
a tax.17 Karlan’s worry, then, comes down to a prediction that
Congress will lack the ingenuity to structure future mandates so that
they are sufficiently tax-like to satisfy five Justices but not so tax-like
as to offend the American people’s anti-tax sensibility. That is
ultimately a view about politics about which neither Professor Karlan
nor I have any special expertise.
In any event, suppose that the ACA ruling really does foreclose
future mandates because the Court has now ruled that Congress lacks
the power to impose them directly and political forces prevent their
imposition through the tax code. So what? For more than twentythree decades after the ratification of the Constitution, Congress
enacted no laws that clearly violated the no-mandate rule announced
in the ACA case.18 It is therefore difficult to believe that the nomandate rule will seriously hamstring future Congresses in achieving
590 (1937))).
15. Karlan, supra note 12.
16. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2594–95 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
17. See id. at 2647 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (suggesting Congress could
constitutionally achieve the ACA’s goals by structuring the tax as a tax credit for those “who do
purchase [health] insurance”); see also Neil H. Buchanan, It Does Not Matter Whether Congress Calls a
Tax a Tax: Explaining the Dissenting Justices’ Misconceptions About the Taxing Power in the
Affordable Care Act Case, VERDICT (July 5, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/07/05/it-does-notmatter-whether-congress-calls-a-tax-a-tax (describing how the dissenters implicitly “embrace the idea
that Congress can [impose the mandate] in two functionally equivalent ways, but the law at issue will be
outside of Congress’s power unless it uses the magic words necessary to bring it under the dissenters’
preferred vocabulary.”).
18. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (noting the “novelty” of
the individual mandate when “Congress has never attempted to rely on [the commerce] power to compel
individuals not engaged in commerce to purchase an unwanted product”).
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important national objectives of the sort it has previously achieved
using the Commerce Clause. The ACA case was never very
important for constitutional law; it was important because of its
immediate political and policy ramifications, involving, as it did, a
signature legislative accomplishment of a first-term President during
a contested re-election campaign19 with respect to a longstanding
policy objective of progressive politicians.20
I should be clear that in saying that the Commerce Clause holding
of the ACA case was constitutionally unimportant, I do not mean that
it was correct. I have long maintained that there is no good reason
why the Commerce Clause ought to permit Congress only to regulate
activity rather than inactivity that has substantial economic effects.21
Certainly, the reasons offered by the Chief Justice and the four
dissenters do not stand up to careful examination.
The Chief Justice pointed to the repeated use of the term “activity”
in the prior case law,22 but that only shows that the prior cases
involved activity—which everyone acknowledged.23 None of the
prior cases had accepted or rejected direct regulation of inactivity
because no case presented the question.
The Chief Justice also argued that the very words “regulate” and
“commerce” connote regulation of pre-existing activity, rather than
legal mandates to engage in activity.24 But that is hardly self-evident.
Consider the provisions of federal labor law and federal antitrust law
that have been construed to forbid secondary boycotts.25 A boycott is
19. See Michael C. Dorf, How Much is Truly at Stake in the Legal Battle Over Obamacare?,
VERDICT (Sept. 26, 2011), http://verdict.justia.com/2011/09/26/how-much-is-truly-at-stake-in-the-legalbattle-over-obamacare.
20. See Ronald Dworkin, Why the Mandate is Constitutional: The Real Argument, N.Y. REV. BOOKS
(May 10, 2012), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/may/10/why-mandate-constitutionalreal-argument/?pagination=false.
21. See Michael C. Dorf, The Constitutionality of Health Insurance Reform, Part II: Congressional
Power, FINDLAW (Nov. 2, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20091102.html.
22. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2587 (“Our precedent . . . uniformly describe the
[commerce] power as reaching ‘activity.’”).
23. See generally, id. 132 S. Ct. 2566.
24. See id. at 2586–89 (“The power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of commercial
activity to be regulated.”).
25. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A), (e) (designating
secondary boycotts as unfair labor practices); NLRB v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO, 473
U.S. 61, 78–79 (1985) (holding secondary boycotts prohibited under Sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e) of the
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economic inactivity—a refusal to engage in business with the
target—in more or less the same way that the non-purchase of health
insurance is economic inactivity. Yet prior to the ACA litigation it
would not have occurred to anyone to challenge the relevant laws as
beyond the scope of the Commerce Power. And prior cases,
especially Wickard v. Filburn,26 accepted that Congress could
penalize one activity—there, the growing of wheat in excess of a
government quota—in order to encourage another activity—the
purchase of wheat in the market.27 Given the traditional view that
Congress is the master of the means for achieving legitimate ends,28
it seems an empty formalism to say that Congress may not do directly
what it may do indirectly.
The conservative Justices’ main argument was that if the ACA
were upheld, then the power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause would be unlimited, in violation of the structure of Article I,
Section 8, and the Tenth Amendment.29 But this claim is false in light
of the Court’s own relatively recent precedents. Even if the ACA had
been upheld under the Commerce Clause, Congress would not be
omnipotent. For example, Congress would still lack the power to ban
the possession of firearms in school zones (per United States v.
Lopez30) or to provide a civil remedy in federal court for gendermotivated violence (per United States v. Morrison).31 Why? Because,
National Labor Relations Act); Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 312
U.S. 457, 465 (1941) (holding secondary boycotts per se illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act).
26. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
27. Id. at 128 (holding that Congress’s “power to regulate commerce includes the power to
regulate . . . prices . . . and practices affecting such prices” and thus Congress was acting within its
authority when attempting to “increase the market price of wheat and to that end to limit the volume
thereof . . .”).
28. See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (“Let the end be legitimate, let
it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.”).
29. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2643 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, & Alito, J.J., dissenting) (“What is absolutely clear, affirmed by the text of the 1789
Constitution, by the Tenth Amendment . . . and by innumerable cases of ours in the 220 years since, is
that there are structural limits upon federal power—upon what it can prescribe with respect to private
conduct, and upon what it can impose upon the sovereign States.”).
30. 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
31. 529 U.S. 598, 601 (2000).
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in the Court’s argot, firearms possession and gender-motivated
violence are not “economic activit[ies].”32
That limit also suggests a straightforward limit on affirmative
mandates: if some activity is not “economic,” then Congress may
neither make that activity the predicate for regulation—as in Lopez
and Morrison—nor may Congress compel otherwise-inactive people
to engage in it—as per the rule that the Chief Justice and the four
conservative dissenters could have laid down in the ACA case. To
give two obvious examples, even if the ACA had been upheld under
the Commerce Clause, Congress still would be powerless to mandate
gun possession near schoolyards or the commission of gendermotivated violence.
Now, it will be immediately objected that these are meaningless
limits. After all, Congress would never try to mandate gendermotivated violence and any law doing so would violate the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.33 That may be a fair objection with respect to the Morrisonbased hypothetical example but the Lopez-based hypothetical
example is harder to dismiss. A number of local governments around
the country have enacted laws mandating gun ownership or
possession in particular locales, such as the home.34 Given the
strength of the gun-rights lobby,35 it is at least possible to imagine
Congress enacting a similar law for the nation as a whole. Doing so
might infringe the Second Amendment, but then again it might not.
32. Id. at 613 (“Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic
activity.”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (“The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an
economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect . . . interstate
commerce.”).
33. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638–39 (1975) (invalidating a gender-based
distinction in the Social Security Act as violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
34. See Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1, 37–38 (2012).
35. See, e.g., Laura I. Langbein & Mark A. Lotwis, The Political Efficacy of Lobbying and Money:
Gun Control in the U. S. House, 1986, 15 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 413, 433 (1990) (concluding, after an
empirical analysis, that the NRA and Handgun Control, Inc. (a pro-gun control group) were effective at
influencing legislative decision-making); Peter H. Stone, History Repeat? NRA Has Blocked New Gun
Laws After Tragedies Like Tucson, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 11, 2011, 1:44 PM, updated Apr.
19, 2011, 3:44 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/01/11/2211/history-repeat (noting the
“legendary” influence of the NRA in Washington, stemming from “the grassroots clout of its 4 million
members and the tens of millions it has spent over the last two decades on campaign contributions and
lobbying”).

Published by Reading Room, 2013

9

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 1

906

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:4

Professor Joseph Blocher has argued that the Second Amendment
right to keep and bear arms as construed in District of Columbia v.
Heller36 and McDonald v. City of Chicago, Illinois37 is best read to
entail a right not to keep and bear arms, but as Professor Blocher
himself acknowledges, the question is difficult and open.38 Let us
suppose that the Second Amendment would not be offended by a
federal law requiring that competent law-abiding adult citizens (duly
defined in the law) keep working firearms in their homes. Would
such a law nonetheless be unconstitutional as beyond the power of
Congress under the Commerce Clause?
Before I answer that question, I need to set aside a complicating
wrinkle. Might a federal law obligating law-abiding adult citizens to
keep firearms in the home be sustained under the power of Congress
“[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia”?39
As Justice Ginsburg noted in the ACA case, as early as 1792
Congress enacted legislation mandating citizens “to purchase
firearms and gear in anticipation of service in the Militia.”40 But my
hypothetical federal mandate would apply to those too old or too
feeble to serve in the militia, and so, at least as applied to them, it
might be said to be beyond the scope of the Militia Clause. Even if
not, we can ask whether the hypothetical gun mandate would also fall
within the scope of the Commerce Clause, on the assumption that
Congress, acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause, may mandate
economic activity but not non-economic activity.
Given Lopez, the answer is pretty clearly no. If gun possession in a
school zone is not economic activity, then neither is gun possession
in the home. To be sure, under the Lopez-based test I am proposing,
the government could use the Commerce power to mandate the
purchase of guns, but it can already effectively accomplish that result
36. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
37. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
38. See Blocher, supra note 34, at 5–7 (admitting that “there are serious objections to” the thesis that
the Second Amendment entails a right not to keep and bear arms).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
40. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2627 n.10 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (citing the Uniform Militia
Act of 1792, 1 Stat. 271).
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under the taxing power: by withholding tax deductions or tax credits
from those who do not purchase guns. For truly economic activity,
only formalism could warrant distinguishing the taxing power from
the Commerce power.
What other activities would Congress be powerless to mandate
under the rule that I am suggesting was implicit in the Court’s prior
Commerce Clause cases? The answer should be found in those cases.
In Gonzales v. Raich,41 the Court invoked a dictionary to define
“economic” activity as “the production, distribution, and
consumption of commodities,”42 but this definition appears to be
under-inclusive because it omits services. Presumably that oversight
simply reflects the fact that Raich involved a commodity—
marijuana—rather than a service.43 In a subsequent case involving
services, we can expect the Court to hold that they too count as
economic activity, at least when traded for money or other value.
The more troubling aspect of Raich is its inclusion of
“consumption of commodities” within the definition of economic
activities.44 Suppose I eat a raspberry that I pick from a bush that
grows wild on my property. Have I really engaged in economic
activity that may serve as the predicate for federal regulation under
the Commerce Clause? It is easy to see why the Raich Court wanted
to include consumption in its definition: by defining the relevant
activity in Raich as the consumption of marijuana, the Court was able
to analogize the case closely to Filburn, where the law aimed to limit
the consumption of home-grown wheat by people like Filburn.45
41. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
42. Id. at 25 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966)).
43. See id. at 18.
44. See id. at 25–26.
45. At least that is how the facts have been understood by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n
of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2587 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (describing farmer Filburn as “growing
wheat for consumption on his own farm”); Raich, 545 U.S. at 18 (“Like the farmer in Wickard,
respondents are cultivating, for home consumption, a fungible commodity for which there is an
established, albeit illegal, interstate market.”). In fact, Filburn’s “homegrown” wheat was almost
certainly part of a larger economic enterprise. To eat the wheat that Filburn grew beyond his quota “the
Filburn family would have had to consume nearly forty-four one-pound loaves of bread each day for a
year.” Jim Chen, The Story of Wickard v. Filburn: Agriculture, Aggregation, and Commerce, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 69, 102 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009). “In Filburn’s time, farmers
fed twenty times more wheat to livestock than they ground into flour for home use.” Id.
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Nonetheless, the inclusion of consumption of commodities in the
definition of economic activity is difficult to reconcile with the
exclusion of possession of a commodity (a gun) in Lopez. Suppose
that instead of just possessing his gun, Lopez had been eating it—
either in the literal sense or as a euphemism for using it to commit
suicide. In what sense would that be an “economic” activity of any
sort?
If consumption of a commodity may serve as the predicate for
federal regulation under the Commerce Clause, that should be
because there is a national market for the commodity and demand to
consume it drives that market, not because the consumption itself is
economic activity. The very Controlled Substances Act at issue in
Raich appeared to reflect Congressional recognition of that fact. The
Act does not outlaw “consumption” of controlled substances but their
manufacture, distribution, dispensation, or possession with intent to
distribute or dispense.46
Accordingly, in the ACA case the Court could have said that while
the purchase of a commodity like broccoli is of course economic
activity that Congress may either forbid or require, its consumption is
not. Such a ruling would have allowed the Court to uphold the
mandate to purchase health insurance under the Commerce Clause
without opening the floodgates for consumption mandates.
So why did the conservative majority reject this path? Setting
aside legal realist and political explanations, part of the answer may
be that five Justices took the language of Raich too seriously.
Thinking that purchasing and consumption were constitutionally
indistinguishable under the Commerce Clause, they saw no way to
sustain the health insurance purchase mandate without also implying
the validity of consumption mandates. Admittedly, this explanation
only partly explains the conservatives’ view in the ACA case because
they also appear to have been concerned about purchase mandates in
their own right. However, given the functional equivalence of tax
incentives and purchase mandates, that concern was a mostly empty
formalism.
46. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006).
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Accordingly, the only real functional concern at play in the five
conservatives’ opinions was—or should have been—a concern about
consumption mandates. But that still leaves us with a puzzle. If (four
of the five of) the Court’s conservatives already thought that
Congress has the power to forbid consumption of commodities,47
why were they troubled by the notion that Congress might compel
such consumption? Why, in other words, is it worse to be forced to
eat broccoli than to be forbidden from eating broccoli? The answer—
if there is one—is more likely to be found in libertarian principles
than in federalism principles.
II. MANDATES AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY
Are there grounds for thinking that legal mandates impose greater
infringements on liberty than do prohibitions? If we ask the question
categorically, the answer must be no. It is easy to imagine affirmative
mandates that impose no burden at all because they merely require
people to do what they would choose to do anyway—a mandate that
people must breathe air, for example—or impose only a trivial
burden—such as an obligation to pay a one-penny head tax. At the
same time, prohibitions can be extraordinarily burdensome—as with
laws forbidding religious rituals, intimate relationships or the use of
what could be life-saving medicine. Only the imagination limits the
range of pairwise comparisons in which most rational people would
clearly prefer to be subject to the mandate rather than the prohibition.
Nonetheless, other things being equal, we can expect mandates to
be more intrusive than prohibitions. Let us compare a mandate to φ48
and a mirroring prohibition on φ-ing. Again, we can imagine many
circumstances in which the prohibition is worse. If φ-ing is breathing,
then anyone who is not suicidal will prefer the mandate to the
47. Justice Thomas is an exception. He would roll back much of modern Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 599–602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(arguing the Court’s interpretation of the Commerce Power starting in the 1930s was a “wrong turn” and
a “dramatic departure . . . from a century and a half of precedent”); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (raising the same concern).
48. I follow the custom in the philosophical literature of using the Greek letter φ, pronounced “phi,”
as the variable that denotes some activity.
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prohibition. But in the more likely scenario, the mandate will be
more intrusive.
Why? Perhaps the mandate leaves less liberty in some rough
quantitative sense. Imagine two polities: Mandatia and Prohibita. The
legislature of each polity has enacted exactly one law. In Mandatia,
everybody must φ. In Prohibita, no one may φ. If we imagine that φing is a somewhat time-consuming activity, then the people of
Prohibita are freer than the people of Mandatia. In Prohibita, it is
true, their liberty is constrained by the law that bans φ-ing, but so
long as they do not φ, the people of Prohibita may do pretty much
whatever they like. By contrast, the people of Mandatia are
effectively forbidden from doing anything other than φ-ing during the
time it takes to φ. Also, if φ-ing is expensive, then when Mandatia
commands people to φ, it makes it impossible for them to use the
funds necessary to φ for any other purpose.
Nonetheless, the cost in time or money is not the main reason
mandates might be considered more intrusive than prohibitions,
ceteris paribus. Some mandates are especially objectionable even
though one can comply with them quickly and at low cost. Laws that
coerce speech comprise an important such category. One can comply
with an obligation to recite the Pledge of Allegiance or to carry the
message “Live Free or Die” on one’s license plate49 without much
commitment of time or money. And yet the Supreme Court cases
invalidating such mandates50 tap into a core libertarian intuition. The
key Pledge case was decided during the Second World War, but it
was not simply the timing that made Justice Robert Jackson’s
invocation of totalitarianism51 appropriate. As the Court later
explained in the less freighted license plate case, the state may not
co-opt its citizens to its own ends; it may not “force[] an
49. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (invalidating criminal prohibition on covering
New Hampshire state motto on license plates); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating mandatory pledge for children in public schools).
50. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
51. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641 (“Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the lesson
of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the
Inquisition, as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian unity,
down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies.”).
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individual . . . to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to
an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable.”52
That instrumentalization distinguishes mandates from prohibitions.
The Barnette and Wooley Courts implied that the government, in
seeking to use its citizens for the government’s ends, had—as Justice
Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts would later complain in the ACA
case53—changed the relationship between the individual and
government. Mandates make citizens tools of the government rather
than vice versa. They thus contravene a prohibition that Immanuel
Kant and his followers have deemed essential to morality.54
The Kantian prohibition on using our fellow human beings as
means to our own ends may find expression in other legal
distinctions between activity and inactivity. Consider, for example,
the common law’s traditional (and largely still extant) rejection of
any duty to rescue strangers. Private morality may oblige us to come
to the aid of our fellow citizens, at least when we can do so at
relatively little risk to ourselves, but the law generally does not55—
even as it imposes all manner of negative duties.56
Thus, the compelled speech cases and the common law’s rejection
of a general duty to rescue render comprehensible the claim by
Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts that such mandates
change the relation between the government and the individual. But
52. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (“Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which forces
an individual, as part of his daily life indeed constantly while his automobile is in public view to be an
instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable.”). For
an excellent analysis of just what was wrong with the laws in Barnette and Wooley, see LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1314–18 (2d ed. 1988).
53. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 6, at 31.
54. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 36–37 (Mary Gregor
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1785).
55. See Williams v. State, 664 P.2d 137, 139 (Cal. 1983) (“As a rule, one has no duty to come to the
aid of another.”); Rhodes v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 665 N.E.2d 1260, 1270 (Ill. 1996) (“Our common law
generally imposes no duty to rescue an injured stranger upon one who did not cause the injury in the
first instance.”); see also, e.g., Marin Roger Scordato, Understanding the Absence of a Duty to
Reasonably Rescue in American Tort Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1447, 1459 (2008).
56. It may be tempting to see the constitutional distinction between positive and negative rights as
carrying out the same principle. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 202 (1989) (finding no due process violation where government officials recorded, but failed to
intervene to prevent, severe child abuse). However, that limitation on the doctrine of state action appears
to implement a distinct policy of separation of powers: Allocation of resources and law enforcement are
generally left to legislative judgment. See id.
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these examples do not make the claim plausible—at least not as a
general matter—because our law recognizes a variety of affirmative
obligations that cannot be reconciled with a general Kantian right
against being treated as a means.
In the ACA litigation, the government put forward various
examples of federal mandates.57 Chief Justice Roberts and the four
dissenters argued that none of the examples demonstrated that the
Commerce power extends to mandates,58 but even if they were right
on that point, such examples do undercut any claim that the
Constitution generally forbids the government from instrumentalizing
citizens. Jury duty, selective service, vaccination requirements, and
of course, the obligation to pay taxes, all treat citizens (or in the last
case, their money) as a means to some collective end. They rest on
the proposition that people, or their labor, belong to us all, rather than
to them alone. And all of these obligations are constitutionally
valid.59
Even the right against compelled speech—which Justice Jackson
extolled in anti-totalitarian terms—is at most the complement of the
right against prohibitions on speech. Indeed, in the commercial
57. See Reply Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 15–16, U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 748426, at *16 (citing cases
involving federal statutes on child support, sex-offender registration and racial discrimination);
Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 12 n.7, Florida
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (No. 3:10-cv-00091RV/EMT), 2010 WL 4876894 (giving examples of jury service, census compliance, and acquiring
armaments for the militia); Reply in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Florida v.
U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Serv., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (No. 3:10-cv-00091-RV/EMT), 2010 WL
5184233 (giving example of requiring commercial land owners to provide accessibility for people with
disabilities).
58. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 n.3 (2012) (“The examples of other
congressional mandates . . . are not to the contrary. Each of those mandates—to report for jury duty, to
register for the draft, to purchase firearms in anticipation of militia service, to exchange gold currency
for paper currency, and to file a tax return—are based on constitutional provisions other than the
Commerce Clause.” (citation omitted)); see also id. at 2587 (“As expansive as our cases construing the
scope of the commerce power have been, they all have one thing in common: They uniformly describe
the power as reaching ‘activity.’ It is nearly impossible to avoid the word when quoting them.”).
59. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (mandating jury trials for criminal prosecutions); Arver v.
United States, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918) (upholding the Selective Service Act); Brushaber v. Union Pac.
R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916) (upholding federal income tax); Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916)
(“[The 13th Amendment] was not intended to interdict enforcement of those duties which individuals
owe to the state, such as service[] . . . on the jury.”); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38–39
(1905) (upholding state law that allowed boards of health to mandate vaccinations).
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context, the case law permits the government to compel speech in
circumstances in which it could not forbid speech.60 Thus,
notwithstanding the Kantian resistance any of us might feel towards
instrumentalization, there does not appear to be any general
constitutional principle that treats mandates as more intrusive on
individual liberty than prohibitions.
But if there is no such general principle, there is nonetheless one
area of case law that does distinguish between mandates and
prohibitions: the doctrine governing the right of bodily integrity. We
see this distinction most clearly in cases involving death and dying.
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the
Supreme Court upheld a Missouri law that forbade the disconnection
of a feeding tube or other medical intervention from a comatose
patient, absent clear and convincing evidence that disconnection
complied with the wishes the patient had expressed when
competent.61 Although the case thus rejected a right-to-die claim, in
doing so the lead opinion assumed arguendo that a competent adult
has a constitutional right to refuse even life-saving medical treatment,
including food and water.62 Justice O’Connor, who cast a fifth and
crucial vote for the majority opinion, stated in a concurrence that she
thought such a right in a competent person was established, not
merely assumed.63
And with good reason: the common law treated nonconsensual
medical treatment as battery64 (absent an emergency in which
consent could be presumed).65 Of course, modern doctrine does not
60. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (holding that compelled
disclosures for commercial speech are subject to a less intrusive form of scrutiny than flat prohibitions).
61. 497 U.S. 261, 286–87 (1990).
62. Id. at 279.
63. Id. at 287 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
64. See id. at 269 (majority opinion); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 cmt. c (1965) (“[A]
surgeon who performs an operation upon a patient who has refused to submit to it is not relieved from
liability by the fact that he . . . believes that the operation is necessary to save the patient’s life. Indeed,
the fact that . . . the patient would have died had the operation not been performed and that the operation
has effected a complete cure is not enough to relieve the physician from liability.”).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892D (1979) (“Conduct that injures another does not make
the actor liable to the other, even though the other has not consented to it if (a) an emergency makes it
necessary or apparently necessary, in order to prevent harm to the other, to act before there is
opportunity to obtain consent from the other or one empowered to consent for him, and (b) the actor has
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constitutionalize all or even most of tort law, but it does appear to
draw a line around the body. The Supreme Court has cited cases like
Winston v. Lee66—involving nonconsensual surgery to obtain
evidence—and Rochin v. California67—involving nonconsensual
pumping of a suspect’s stomach for the same purpose—as
cornerstones of the constitutional right to bodily integrity.68 The
government may not compel citizens to do with their bodies as the
government chooses—at least absent a very strong justification.
But while mandates involving the body abridge the constitutional
right to bodily integrity, prohibitions generally do not. Compare the
Court’s assumed constitutional right to avoid medical treatment with
the Court’s rejection of a right against prohibitions on particular
medical interventions. Even while no doubt aware of the
constitutional overtones, the Court rejected any statutory right to take
the experimental drug Laetrile69 or to use medical marijuana.70 Also,
in marked contrast with the right against compelled life-saving
treatment assumed in Cruzan, the Court in Washington v.
Glucksberg71 unanimously rejected a right to resist prohibitions on
physician-assisted suicide. The majority opinion relied extensively on
the distinction between a patient who refuses a medical
intervention—that is, one who refuses to submit to a mandate to
accept medical treatment—and a patient who wishes to violate the
prohibition on acting to commit suicide.72 We can thus understand
the distinction between the assumed right to let nature take its course
and the non-right to hasten death as implementing a libertarian

no reason to believe that the other, if he had the opportunity to consent, would decline.”); see, e.g.,
Perna v. Pirozzi, 457 A.2d 431, 461 (N.J. 1983) (“Absent an emergency, patients have the right to
determine . . . whether surgery is to be performed on them . . . .”).
66. 470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985).
67. 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
68. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992).
69. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
70. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
71. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
72. Id. at 725 (“The decision to commit suicide with the assistance of another may be just as
personal and profound as the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, but it has never enjoyed
similar legal protection. Indeed, the two acts are widely and reasonably regarded as quite distinct.”).
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principle holding that, at least with respect to bodily integrity,
mandates are worse than prohibitions.
Was the Court in Glucksberg warranted in treating the
act/omission distinction as a proxy for the strength of the liberty
claim?73 If so, it might be for the Kantian reasons I referred to above.
All four of the dissenters in Cruzan argued that the Court gave
insufficient procedural protection for the right to refuse medical
treatment, arguing that the state had elevated its conception of the
value of Nancy Cruzan’s life above her own.74 The state, in this view,
instrumentalized Cruzan in violation of the categorical imperative,
disregarding her own ends in favor of the ends that the state chose.
To be sure, five Justices upheld the procedural scheme at issue in
Cruzan,75 but in doing so they did not reject the core Kantian insight
the dissenters propounded: the majority’s assumption that a
competent person would have the right to refuse medical treatment
even if death results is itself best understood as a product of the
Kantian principle.
The centrality of the activity/inactivity distinction to cases
involving the right to bodily integrity explains the rhetorical power of
two claims that were made about the ACA: that it authorized “death
panels” and that upholding the Act would mean that a law mandating
broccoli purchases would likewise be valid. The original “death
panels” charge took aim at a provision76 in a House version of the
then-pending legislation that would have authorized Medicare
73. I co-authored an amicus brief on the losing side of Glucksberg, arguing, inter alia, that both
physician-assisted suicide and the right to refuse medical treatment assumed in Cruzan are acts rather
than omissions. Brief Amicus Curiae of State Legislation in Support of Respondents, Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 709339. But the Court rejected that framing of the question.
74. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 313 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“The only state interest asserted here is a general interest in the preservation of life. But the State has no
legitimate general interest in someone’s life, completely abstracted from the interest of the person living
that life, that could outweigh the person’s choice to avoid medical treatment.”); id. at 344–45 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (“Missouri asserts that its policy is related to a state interest in the protection of
life. . . . Missouri insists, without regard to Nancy Cruzan’s own interests, upon equating her life with
the biological persistence of her bodily functions.”).
75. Id. at 280.
76. America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 1233 (2009).
However, H.R. 3200 was never enacted, and the ACA, as enacted and signed, contained no such
provision.
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reimbursement for end-of-life planning discussions between doctors
and patients.77 Although nothing in the bill would have required
patients to forgo medical treatment to which they were otherwise
entitled or even to schedule appointments to make end-of-life plans,
some conservative politicians and pundits nevertheless asserted that
Congress and the Obama Administration were opening the door to
rationing of care.78 The charge persisted even after the Medicare
provision was dropped. Former Alaska Governor and 2008
Republican Vice Presidential candidate Sarah Palin, who had
spearheaded the initial death panels charge, shifted gears in 2012,
arguing that a different provision of the ACA—the one creating the
Independent Payment Advisory Board—would act as the “death
panel” that would ration care.79 Neither the original death panel
charge nor its revised version ever had much grounding in reality,80
but it had substantial emotional (and thus political) force because it
tapped into a version of the Kantian worry.
A government that rations health care—or even one that asks its
citizens to think about the costs and benefits of end-of-life care—
tacitly asserts that life under some conditions has more worth than
life under other conditions. The fear that the government does not
simply defer to people’s prior judgments about the value of their
lives is the same fear that the Cruzan dissenters raised.81 No matter
how far-fetched in light of the actual content of the ACA, the fear of
death panels may have been the same fear that drove the Court’s
concern about instrumentalization in the bodily integrity cases in
general and the right-to-die cases in particular. Nonetheless, the fear
of death panels was not a fear that government would mandate
activity, and thus it did not translate directly into the constitutional
argument that the government may not regulate inactivity. To make
77. Jim Rutenberg & Jackie Calmes, False ‘Death Panel’ Rumor Has Some Familiar Roots, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 13, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/14/health/policy/14panel.html.
78. Constance Uribe, Commentary, The Coming Obamacare Rationing Government to Determine
Value of Individual Lives, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at B04, available at 2012 WLNR 23837814.
79. Jason Millman, Sarah Palin Revives ‘Death Panel’ Message, POLITICO (June 26, 2012, 12:52
PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0612/77838.html.
80. See Kessler, supra note 11.
81. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 313 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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that move, the ACA’s opponents needed a different example.
Broccoli fit the bill perfectly.
Under extant constitutional doctrine, a law forbidding the
consumption of broccoli would be subject to rational basis scrutiny,
in the same way that laws forbidding the consumption of marijuana
are subject only to rational basis scrutiny82—even though such
prohibitions clearly implicate bodily integrity: they regulate what
people may put in their bodies. Nonetheless, the mandate/prohibition
distinction is crucial here. A law that required the ingestion of
broccoli would infringe the substantive due process right to bodily
integrity. The right to bodily integrity is chiefly a right to keep the
government from forcing us to use our bodies in ways that we do not
want to use them, rather than a right to do particular things with our
bodies. Accordingly, a successful substantive due process challenge
could very likely be mounted against a law compelling the
consumption of broccoli.
The hypothetical broccoli mandate was nonetheless inapt,
however, because the ACA did not in fact infringe bodily integrity. A
mandate to consume broccoli is analogous to a mandate to accept
medical treatment: both infringe bodily integrity. But the ACA
contains no mandate to submit to medical treatment. It only mandates
the payment of money for (insurance to cover) medical treatment,
which persons subject to the mandate remain free to refuse. Thus, as
others have pointed out,83 a tighter analogy would have been a
mandate to purchase broccoli. However, the ACA’s opponents likely
wanted to avoid that analogy because it pushes strongly in favor of
82. See State v. Murphy, 570 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Ariz. 1977) (in banc) (“[T]here is a substantial body
of expert and sincere opinion on both sides of the question. That being the case, we cannot say that the
legislature had no rational or reasonable basis for proscribing the use of marijuana.”); Ill. NORML, Inc.
v. Scott, 383 N.E.2d 1330, 1335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (applying rational basis scrutiny and upholding law
prohibiting private possession and use of marijuana); John C. Williams, Annotation, Constitutionality of
State Legislation Imposing Criminal Penalties for Personal Possession or Use of Marijuana, 96
A.L.R.3d 225, § 5(a) (1979) (surveying cases where state laws prohibiting possession or use were
challenged).
83. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Op-Ed., The Broccoli Test, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/opinion/health-insurance-and-the-broccoli-test.html;
Daniel
Shaviro, The Supreme Court’s Healthcare Decision, WESTVIEW NEWS (Aug. 2012),
http://westviewnews.org/2012/08/the-supreme-courts-healthcare-decision/.
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upholding the ACA, at least under the taxing power. After all,
government routinely uses its taxing power to take money from
citizens to fund purchases of food and other items that many of those
citizens will never use.84
CONCLUSION
Apt or not, the broccoli analogy had emotional resonance with the
Court’s conservatives in the ACA case because it called to mind a
real constitutional concern—the worry that mandates could violate
the substantive due process right to bodily integrity. That is more
than a little bit ironic, given that the Court’s two staunchest
conservatives—Justices Scalia and Thomas—have expressed doubt
about the legitimacy of all substantive due process rights.85
The irony goes deeper still, for in construing the enumerated
powers to protect bodily integrity, the Court’s conservative wing
relied on a right that finds very strong expression in the abortion
jurisprudence86 that Justices Scalia and Thomas hold in special
84. Agricultural subsidies are a leading example. Each year, the federal government uses taxpayer
money to deliver $3.6 billion in subsidies that contribute to the production of grains fed to farmed
animals. R. DENNIS OLSON, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POLICY, BELOW-COST FEED CROPS: AN
INDIRECT SUBSIDY FOR INDUSTRIAL ANIMAL FACTORIES 1 (2006), available at
http://www.nffc.net/Learn/Reports/BelowCost6_06.pdf. As a vegan, I will eat none of the resulting
products, but that fact does not entitle me to complain about the use of my pro rata share of the tax
money for their purchase.
85. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“If I thought that
‘substantive due process’ were a constitutional right rather than an oxymoron, I would think it [was]
violated by bait-and-switch taxation.”); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:
The Role of the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, Lecture at
Princeton University (Mar. 8 & 9, 1995), in THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES (1994–1995),
available at http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/scalia97.pdf. For Justice Thomas’s view,
see McDonald v. City of Chicago, Illinois, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058–59 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I
agree with the Court that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the right to keep and bear arms set forth in
the Second Amendment ‘fully applicable to the States.’ . . . But I cannot agree that it is enforceable
against the States through a clause that speaks only to ‘process.’ Instead, the right to keep and bear arms
is a privilege of American citizenship that applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Privileges or Immunities Clause.”).
86. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992) (“Roe, however, may be seen
not only as an exemplar of Griswold liberty but as a rule (whether or not mistaken) of personal
autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing limits on governmental
power to mandate medical treatment or to bar its rejection. If so, our cases since Roe accord with Roe’s
view that a State’s interest in the protection of life falls short of justifying any plenary override of
individual liberty claims.”).
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disregard.87 Indeed, one can understand the objection to abortion
prohibitions as fundamentally an objection to mandated activity.
Abortion prohibitions formally forbid an act—abortion. But in
substance they mandate an act—the use of a woman’s body to gestate
a human life. If it is an intolerable infringement on liberty for the
government to require anyone to ingest a single piece of broccoli,
surely it is no less an infringement for the government to mandate
that a woman give over her uterus to another being for nine months.88
Thus, following the libertarian logic of the broccoli example to its
natural conclusion, it is not surprising that the lawyers who advanced
it in the hope of swaying five conservative Justices were content to
disguise their liberty claim as a federalism claim.

87. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 169 (2007) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring)
(“I write separately to reiterate my view that the Court’s abortion jurisprudence . . . has no basis in the
Constitution.”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 980 (Scalia, J., joined by, inter alios, Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“That is, quite simply, the issue in these cases: not whether the
power of a woman to abort her unborn child is a ‘liberty’ in the absolute sense; or even whether it is a
liberty of great importance to many women. Of course it is both. The issue is whether it is a liberty
protected by the Constitution of the United States. I am sure it is not.”).
88. In saying that forced pregnancy is at least as burdensome on liberty as forced broccoli
consumption, I mean to be making an utterly uncontroversial claim. One could grant the point but still
think that abortion restrictions are justified in light of the government’s interest in fetal life.
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